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Indicators of "trust", "confidence", "optimism" or "sentiment" among consumers and/or investors,
are published continuously in the mass media. More importantly, these indices seem not only to
reflect how the state of the real economy is perceived by private agents, but can also help predict
the future course of the business cycle. Moreover, in econometric analyses they have even been
found to "cause" business activity. In this paper, we first make an attempt to clear all of the above
mentioned notions and to interpret their economic content. We thus intend to provide a theoretical
foundation for how "pessimism" and "optimism", in conjunction with estimation errors committed
by private agents, can drive the real economy. Furthermore, the model presented is capable of in-
corporating the revision of expectations of private agents through Bayesian updating, to create a
fully endogenized business cycle. The results achieved in simulation experiments confirm the pos-
sibility of constant, rising and declining oscillations in the growth rate of consumption and income.
Key words: Business Cycles, Rational Beliefs, Bayesian Updating, Consumer Behaviour.
Die wirtschaftliche Fachpresse und die Massenmedien berichten kontinuierlich  über die Entwick-
lung  von  Indikatoren, welche Auskunft geben  sollen  über das " Vertrauen", die " Zuversicht", den
"Optimismus" oder schlicht die "Gefühlslage" bei Konsumenten und/oder Investoren. Dieses Indi-
katoren scheinen nicht nur die Ansicht der privaten Akteure über den Zustand der Ökonomie wider-
zuspiegeln, sondern können auch dazu  verwendet werden, den  Verlauf  des Konjunkturzyklus  zu
prognostizieren. Ökonometrische Analysen haben gezeigt, daß sie in der Lage sind, den Verlauf der
wirtschaftlichen  Entwicklung zu " verursachen". In  diesem  Beitrag  sollen  zunäcst  eine  Reihe der
o. a. Begriffe geklärt und ihr ökonomischer Gehalt interpretiert werden. Anschließend unternehmen
wir den Versuch, den Gang der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im Zyklus durch das Zusammenspiel
von " Optimismus" bzw. " Pessimismus" einerseits und das Auftreten bestimmter Erwartungsfehler
andererseits zu erklären. Das Modell bedient sich eines Bayesianischen Lernprozesses und kreiert
einen völlig endogenen Konjunkturzyklus. Numerische Simulationen zeigen, daß durch das Modell
konstante,  zunehmende  sowie  abnehmende  Oszillationen  des  Konsum-  und  des  Einkommens-
wachstums erzeugt werden können.
Schlagworte: Konjunkturzyklus, Rationale Überzeugung, Bayesianisches Lernen, Konsumverhalten.
JEL-Klassifikation:  E32, E37, E21, E27Optimism, Pessimism and the Unforeseen: Modelling an Endogenous Business Cycle Driven by Strong Beliefs 2
"Then I saw her face
Now I' m a believer
Not a trace of doubt in my mind
I' m in love
I' m a believer




It is fair to say that theories of the business cycle are not really booming in our profession. On the
other hand, the business site and the large public group interested in "commercial affairs", are
greatly concerned with time series which report on the "business climate" (as the IFO index), "con-
sumers' sentiment" (index of consumer sentiment, ICS, collected and compiled by the University of
Michigan Survey Research  Center), "consumers confidence" (the index of the US Conference
Board and of the EU commission) or likewise, "investors confidence" (Mussler 2001, p. 7). All of
these indices intend to grasp the opinions of consumers and investors on the state of the economy
and their expectations towards the future, during a business cycle. The notions being used here are
mostly located in the semantics of psychology and of subjective judgements rather than in a world
of "rational expectations", which cannot be fooled by politicians systematically.
ii
The same public does not take much interest in the highly sophisticated theoretical and empirical
contributions by professional and academic economists. This state of the art seems to be quite un-
satisfactory. The discipline of explaining the business cycle is dominated today by and large, by
approaches which have their foundations in the new classical macroeconomics (NCM). Why do not
we have a brief look at the NCM and their attempt to contribute to the theory of the business cycle?
Interestingly, the early papers of the NCM are in need of so-called "propagation
iii mechanisms" to
create a business cycle. This is due to the fact that the Lucas supply function only allows the expla-
nation of real output effects (whether positive or negative), in the consequence of unexpected
monetary shocks which, by definition, are stochastic and cannot be anticipated systematically. The
induced "real movements are of no longer duration than the duration of the shock" (Lucas 1994,
p. 181). If the natural output is associated with a normal usage of capacities, only a downswing or
an upswing from here can be explained without recurring to "propagation elements". To explain the
business cycle however, the main challenge is to be able to say why and when we have the turning
points.1  Introduction 3
Two main "propagation elements" are found in the business cycle models of the NCM: "one
mechanism stems from the presence of costs of firms of adjusting their stocks of capital and labour
rapidly. The presence of these costs is known to make it optimal for firms to spread out over time
their response to the relative price signals they receive. That is, such a mechanism causes a firm to
convert the serially un-correlated forecasts errors in predicting relative prices into serially correlated
movements in factor demands and output. A second propagation mechanism is already present in
the most classical of economic growth models. Households' optimal accumulation plans for claims
on physical capital and other assets convert serially  un-correlated impulses into serially correlated
demands for the accumulation of real assets" (Lucas/Sargent 1988, p. 313). In later papers, persis-
tence of effects is due to "information lags" and/or "accelerator effects" (Lucas 1994, p. 181). As
Piljoo (1992, p. 14) puts it, it is questionable whether, in the Lucas model "suppliers rather than
demanders misperceive money shocks for relative price shocks". Generally spoken, the NCM
model by and large neglects the information structure on the side of demanders and more precisely,
on the side of consumers.
It is striking to see that NCM – as far as it was meant to contribute to the theory of business cycles –
though based on "expectations", has been unable to capture the effects of "surprise" and "disap-
pointment" beyond the framework of the Lucas supply function. The strict interpretation of the ra-
tional expectation hypothesis (REH) has also prevented authors of NCM to identify the relevance
and significance of "optimism" and "pessimism" as priors, or rational strong beliefs of economic
agents. There is perhaps one exemption:  Burdekin and  Langdana (1995, pp. 148-169) make a
strong, but in my view, fruitless effort to introduce optimism (which, by the way, they call "confi-
dence", an error in semantics as shown below), into a REH model. Instead of capturing optimism as
a strong belief or prior (see below), they pretend that "confidence includes idiosyncratic respondent-
specific information, (that is, an idiosyncratic shock, the author) in the current time period in addi-
tion to the mathematical forecasts. ... Thus, ... we see 'confidence' as capturing additional informa-
tion not yet readily available in contemporaneous data" (ibid., p. 147). Obviously, we find here a
severe confusion between the belief itself and the way believers learn from new information.
One may argue that NCM went beyond the early contributions of the later Nobel prize winner,
Robert E. Lucas Jr Furthermore, it could be stated that models of "real business cycles" – as in the
seminal paper of Long and Plosser (1983) – are of the NCM type, as they work with rational ex-
pectations. This argument is somehow misleading; in these models "business cycles arise from
technology shocks and intertemporal  labor, leisure, and consumption substitutions in response to
these surprises" (Kades 1985, p. 22). Technology shocks, as a source for business cycles, follow the
tradition of Knut Wicksell's classical contribution,
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body can expect them. This makes a strong difference to the attitude of agents in the "old" NCM
models, where agents are involved in a game against the monetary authority. An authority which,
by the way, makes announcements on which it can cheat. Technology shocks cannot raise expecta-
tions and are, almost by definition, unexpected. Here, I am afraid, NCM is less accurate than in
many other parts of its theory!
There is not much comfort to be gained from other strands of business cycle theory either. While a
number of papers "succeeded" in introducing the REH into models of the business cycle routed in
Keynesian macroeconomics – as for example Dornbusch's and Fisher's modification (1994) of the
political business cycle model of Nordhaus (1975) – "in fact, no existing Keynesian macroeconomic
model incorporates ... an economic model of learning" (Lucas and Sargent 1988, p. 316). One
should not extend this affirmation cautiously to the whole class of models which do not strictly
follow the NCM. It will be the aim of this paper to do the job in this field. We will attempt to recon-
sider on the one hand, the forces which drove the business cycle in Samuelson's seminal paper of
1939 – consumers' and investors' demand – , taking into account on the other hand, the role also of
expectations and of learning in a framework different from and competing with the REH.
The paper is organised as follows: The next section (chapter 2) is devoted to clear the notions of
confidence/suspicion on the one hand and of pessimism and optimism on the other. We show how
optimism/pessimism have been integrated into the theory of finance and of competition on goods'
markets etc. It is also discussed whether optimism (pessimism) can be identified with risk love
(aversion) and whether it is due to informational deficiencies and/or asymmetries. Chapter 3 then
presents our own model of the business cycle, with private consumption as the main driving force
of economic activity. We come up with a difference equation of second order (for consumption and
income growth rates instead of income levels) in the tradition of Samuelson's seminal paper (1939),
which is complicated by the fact that agents hold different attitudes during alternative phases of the
cycle, but are also willing to revise their expectations by applying  Bayesian learning/updating.
Chapter 4 presents some simulation experiments. Chapter 5 questions the empirical evidence of our
thoughts. The final chapter 6 addresses conclusions and opens questions for future research.
2  CLEARING KEY NOTIONS: CONFIDENCE VERSUS SUSPICION;
SCEPTICISM/PESSIMISM VERSUS OPTIMISM
In the framework of game theory "trust" or "confidence" can be modelled and/or interpreted as a
particular subjective probability assigned by the principal in the event that the agent implements the
required level of input, care etc., which is the action desired by the principal ( Demougin 1999,2  Clearing Key Notions: Confidence versus Suspicion; Scepticism/Pessimism versus Optimism 5
p. 305). Both players find themselves in an agency relationship characterised by "moral hazard and
adverse selection" (ibid., p. 303) and can be taken to be risk-neutral (see below a brief discussion on
the attitude towards risk among optimists and pessimists). It is typical for such a game to find a
trade-off for the cheating strategy of the agent; on the one hand the direct (short-term) gain of
cheating may exceed the rent of implementing the required input but, on the other hand at the (long-
term) risk that the game ends. Hence ex-ante, it is not clear whether the expected present value of
cheating dominates vis-à-vis implementing.
In our context, we are more interested in game situations where the players are – excluding excep-
tions – not in an agency relationship, but confronted with the classical prisoners dilemma in a
Kydland/Prescott/Barro/Gordon world. What sort of meaning can trust or confidence have here?
Obviously, confidence has to be linked to the issue of expectations. According to the view put for-
ward by Maaß and Sell (1998, p. 520), confidence or likewise confident expectations, can persist
even if a central bank dares to cheat the public as long as cheating is regarded only as a transitory
phenomenon and it implies "the belief by private agents that any actual monetary target deviation
by the central bank will be 'healed' by a compensating policy in the (near) future so that the medium
to long-term achievements in the field of price stability is put in danger" (ibid.).
Yet, confidence or trust is not the opposite to scepticism/pessimism (the first being some sort of
weaker pessimism) as some papers tend to argue implicitly, but suspiciously. Accordingly, scepti-
cism or pessimism matches optimism (Allen/Faulhaber 1988, p. 398). As our paper is not concerned
with confidence/trust versus suspicion/distrust in the first place, we shall concentrate the following
on the notions of optimism and pessimism. When doing so, we are aware of the fact that a number
of papers mention "pessimism" or "optimism" in their title (see for example Drazen 1988 or Tallon
2000), but reading those papers, it soon becomes apparent that they are not really interested in either
of theses terms.
If one would still be interested to relate the notion of confidence to the attitude of optimism, the
answer is straightforward: Contrary to the observation of confidence, where at least one individual
has to be confident in someone else, optimism (pessimism) in comparison, has to do with (the lack
of) self-confidence. Moreover, in the definition of  Heifetz and Spiegel (2000, pp. 1 and 2), "opti-
mists overestimate the positive impact of their own actions, pessimists underestimate it, and only
realists assess it correctly". An interesting result from game theory is that "an optimist who overes-
timates the return to his actions, behaves more "aggressively" than a realist and chooses a higher
level of action". Furthermore, when the actions "of one individual impose a positive externality on
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haviour from rivals" (ibid.). This mechanism obviously not only has a strong link to the phenome-
non of the business cycle, but it also fits nicely into the explanation patterns of the new growth the-
ory.
Entrepreneurs, who are unrealistically optimistic about the productivity of their own firms, must not
necessarily be forced out of business. As Manove (1995, p. 5) explains, optimism regarding pro-
ductivity of input factors "creates an incentive for agents to increase their savings rates and work
effort which can lead to a larger steady-state income". The mechanism involved works like an in-
verse Lucas critique effect, where new facts trigger new expectations and hence, an adjusted be-
haviour of agents. Opposed to this, in the Manove model specific expectations trigger new behav-
iour, thus new economic facts. A negative side effect of the  Manove type of optimism is that
entrepreneurs hire too many external resources (negative efficiency effect), which in consequence,
will be overutilised (ibid., p. 8). The same applies to their internal resources (effort, savings), but
this can be understood as a positive incentive effect.
A number of authors identify the attitude of optimism with the observation "that most people are
overconfident about their own relative abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their futures"
(Camerer/Lovallo 1999, p. 306).
v As a result, economic agents tend to execute economic decisions –
like business and/or market entry – which, without misjudging one's own relative skills, might not
have occurred. It seems as if optimism comes in here as sort of illusion and/or missing realism, as
the subjects concerned "seem to neglect the fact that they are competing with a reference group of
subjects who all think they are skilled too" (ibid., p. 307). Max Weber, by the way, has apparently
been a strong opponent to any "naive" optimism among philosophers; as Hennis (2001, p. 17) re-
ports, he blamed some of his colleagues for their attempt to find the road to happiness and justice in
science. "Who would believe in that", he is quoted, "only great children on their reading desk or in
press rooms" (ibid.).
Statistically spoken, a majority of agents pretend to be above the average in skills, although, if the
trait is symmetrically distributed, only half of them can be. Optimists are blamed for not thinking
that "everybody else is thinking the same way" (ibid., p. 315). We will demonstrate below that this
interpretation of optimism/pessimism gives a rather narrow view of the relevant issue, if at all. Be-
cause, if the mechanism cited would not exist, one could hardly explain consumers optimism in a
macroeconomic framework.
Another possibility to differentiate between confidence and optimism is put forward by Ripperger
(1998): As in the case of hopes, optimism is related to exogenous risks with the important implica-
tion that in principle no contract can be made with the agent who possibly triggers the uncertain2  Clearing Key Notions: Confidence versus Suspicion; Scepticism/Pessimism versus Optimism 7
events. As opposed to this, confidence is related to endogenous risks, that is in situations where the
risk taken by some agent is dependent of the behaviour of another agent. In principle, a contract can
be signed between these two agents (ibid., p. 38). Such a contract (see above) may (but must not) be
one between an agent and a principal.
Also econometricians tend to identify optimism (pessimism) with overestimation (underestimation);
as Rasmusen (1998) explains, "if policies are used more where they are more effective at the mar-
gin, then both casual empiricism and ordinary least squares estimates are biased towards optimism
about the policies" (ibid., p. 65). The analyst may fail in his predictions if he does not take into ac-
count that times and places for a policy are not identical. The hotel tax revenue case serves as a
good example: "A state's hotel tax is either high or low, trading off revenue against harm to tourism.
In 25 states, the high hotel tax would rise $ 100 in revenue per capita more than the low tax, and
those states adopt the tax. In the other 25 states, the higher tax would so discourage business that the
change in tax revenue per capita would be $ 0. The analyst notices that the 25 states with the high
tax have $ 100 higher revenue per capita, a difference that is statistically significant. He therefore
advises all states to impose high taxes, even though, in truth, the added benefit (in the former low
tax states, the author) is zero. He has overestimated the benefit of increasing the policy's intensity"
(ibid., p. 76).
Yet, to be overconfident in the impact of one's own actions, or to overestimate the effectiveness of a
policy adoption, does not cover all aspects of optimism. There are optimists who do not act at all in
the sense of an entrepreneur or of an adviser to the policy-maker, but simply as consumers. In their
model, Allen and Faulhaber consider a two-periods-decision problem and they define optimism as
an initial belief (1988, p. 397) or prior (ibid., p. 401), which is the probability assigned by consum-
ers to the quality of a good/quality of the inputs used. If this probability is chosen as one (zero), one
can speak of extreme optimism (pessimism) which makes learning impossible, as experience is ig-
nored (ibid., p. 401). But for reasonable values for that probability, consumers have the possibility
to observe the performance of the good in period 1 and hence to learn: "observations of the output
lead them to revise these beliefs" (ibid., p. 397). This information will then affect their willingness
to pay for the good in period 2. Building up the reputation of a firm means, in this framework, hav-
ing a good first period performance.
Optimism/pessimism and consumers have more in common. The optimism of single consumers will
be reinforced – and hence translated into a growing consumer demand on the macroeconomic level
– once the well-known bandwagon effects (Sell 1997, pp. 8-10) come into play. What has been used
to be framed "herding" in modern analysis of international financial crises (Sell 2001), has a corol-Optimism, Pessimism and the Unforeseen: Modelling an Endogenous Business Cycle Driven by Strong Beliefs 8
lary in the leader-follower relationship in consumption behaviour. Bandwagon effects can work in
both directions and so contribute to understanding why consumers beliefs tend to homogenise dur-
ing both the upswing and the downswing phase of the business cycle. Burdekin and  Langdana
(1995, p. 145) conclude that there is an "enhancing catalytic effect of consumer sentiment. There-
fore, fluctuations in explanatory variables that are not simultaneously accompanied by fluctuations
in sentiment, might have a disproportionately lower effect on overall economic activity".
Cautious optimists or pessimists are, as the model explains, able to learn. Then, they should be ca-
pable to avoid the confirmation bias which is meant to be "the tendency to seek information that
confirms one's own views and overlook evidence that may disconfirm these views" (Heifetz/Spiegel
2000, p. 9). An important conclusion emerges here: Optimists, like pessimists, are not irrational
individuals. Rather they make forecasts built on the same past set of information, assigning different
weights never the less, to the components of this information. A crucial question, however, is to
explain how optimists/pessimists learn from (present and future) reality. More precisely, the ques-
tion has to be raised how the learning process can be modelled in such a way that the "irrationality"
of adaptive expectations can be avoided. One proposal states that agents have to correct their initial
beliefs by adopting the Bayesian rule of learning (Demougin 1999, p. 307).
In finance, optimism and pessimism can be found being used as terms used to describe specific at-
titudes on the part of the market participants concerning capital markets. Some authors relate opti-
mism/pessimism to uncertainty, others to risk. To Wakker (1990, p. 459), for example, "a pessimist
dislikes uncertainty, hence the reduction of uncertainty through hedging will lead to additional ap-
preciation. An optimist, who expects  uncertainty to turn out favourable, will not appreciate the re-
duction of uncertainty through hedging". Opposing this, Anderson (1986, p. 183) defines "the more
optimistic agent (in the sense of higher expected period t+1 price conditional on private informa-
tion)", being someone who "invests more in the risky asset than the less optimistic agent". On the
other hand, "an agent being pessimistic about the period t+1 price will thus find it optimal to invest
his whole wealth in the riskless asset rather than in the risky asset" (ibid.). Anderson also stresses
however, that "the most optimistic information (the most pessimistic information, the author) is not
necessarily the most reliable from a social point of view" (ibid., p. 185). In a recent paper, Kyle and
Wang (1997, p. 2074) reach an extraordinary result which somehow hits the REH: In a model of
two risk-neutral speculative traders, the "overconfident trader may make a higher expected profit
and utility than his rational opponent ... and a higher profit and utility than if he were also rational".
Moreover, this outcome is not just short-lived and the "survival of overconfidence is due to the fact
that overconfidence acts like a commitment device to aggressive trading" (ibid.), a result which
nicely complements the positive externalities cited above.3  The Model 9
Optimism is an issue in the business of making forecasts on financial markets as well; "the analyst's
decision to issue optimistic earnings forecasts is based on a comparison of the costs and benefits of
doing so. The benefits are derived primarily from higher brokerage commissions and better man-
agement relations; the costs relate to analyst reputation and legal liability. When the costs of issuing
an optimistic forecast are high relative to the benefits of doing so, optimism will be less apparent or
absent"( Espahbodi et al. 2001, p. 3).
The question as to what may cause these different attitudes arises. Is optimism (pessimism) reflect-
ing a risk-loving (risk-averse) character of agents? Or is it that information is imperfect on the one
hand and the access to it asymmetrical on the other? Or is information symmetrical, but the valua-
tion of its content asymmetrical? Basically, we follow the answer given to theses questions by Kurz
(1994); optimism or pessimism are not hinged upon different levels of information and/or upon an
asymmetric access to information: "agents may exhibit drastic differences in beliefs even when they
have the same information" (ibid., p. 878). Optimism or pessimism do not reflect – analogously to
the modelling of trust in an agency relationship (see above) risk-neutrality can be assigned to every
player – different risk attitudes, but the formation of a "conditional probability belief .. about the
future sequence of random variables" (ibid., p. 879). Though information on past data is the same
for everybody, not all agents "hold the same probability belief and make the same forecasts" (ibid.,
p. 878). It seems indeed, that valuation plays a major role: "important but infrequent events may be
assigned (different, the author) significant probabilities" (ibid., p. 893) by different agents. These
probabilities are grounded in "subjective criteria which represent individual theories about the envi-
ronment" (ibid., p. 894).
The impression one acquires from the enormously rich though heterogeneous literature dealing with
strong beliefs like optimism or pessimism, is refreshing and encouraging. Can it be that, based on
this type of "correctable irrationality", we may get closer to the clues of business cycles and eco-
nomic growth?
3  THE MODEL
If we want to profit from the insights the relevant literature has to offer and if we also want to im-
plement in a model of the business cycle an observation of the day-to-day economic behaviour,
vi
cautious optimists and pessimists should be present in the model. We need their prior attitude to
understand upward and downward forces in the economy, but we also need them to be learning in-
dividuals who are either surprised (the pessimists) or disappointed (the optimists). Otherwise, we
could not explain the core issue in any theory of the business cycle: the turning points! If the styl-
ised fact on business cycles – upswings constitute two thirds, downswings one third of one full cy-Optimism, Pessimism and the Unforeseen: Modelling an Endogenous Business Cycle Driven by Strong Beliefs 10
cle – continues to work, optimism is a sufficient and necessary condition for the long-term growth
perspectives of modern economies which "pure rationality" could fulfil, at best, to a less degree.
Which are our assumptions? First, like in Zorn and Martin (1986, p. 166), "all individuals are as-
sumed to be risk neutral which focuses the analysis on differences in individuals' beliefs rather than
their attitudes towards risk".
Second: While it is true that "in practice, society is composed of heterogeneous individuals who
may differ from one another in their degree of optimism/pessimism" (Heifetz/Spiegel 2000, p. 19),
during an upswing/downswing of the economy, the majority of the individuals will share the same
attitude. This assumption comes as a sort of mirror to another assumption made by Zorn and Mar-
tin: "the more uncertain an outcome the more heterogeneous are beliefs" (ibid., p. 167). In other
words: The more all relevant indicators point at an economic upswing (downswing), the more indi-
viduals will "convert" to optimism (pessimism). Likewise, one may say that optimism (pessimism)
is endogenized by the business cycle itself.
Third: A German proverb says: " Optimismus ist ansteckend" (optimism is contagious). This is an
essential of the model which can additionally explain why there is a strong tendency to homogenise
beliefs during the upswing (downswing) of the cycle. It helps to explain reinforcing effects, but of
course it cannot help in explaining the turning points.
Fourth: How are optimistic (pessimistic) beliefs associated to each other? There are only two types
of belief, one (P) assigning a high probability to (higher) economic growth ( y) and the other, a
complementary probability (1-P) assigning a low probability to (higher) economic growth. More
precisely:
(1)  If  1 P 0 £ <  and  1 ) P 1 ( 0 £ - <  for  [ ] 1 t t y y prob P - > =  and
[ ] 1 t t y y prob ) P 1 ( - £ = -  where P, (1-P) stand for subjective probabilities.
Fifth: As in Grant/Karni (2000, p. 1), we assume that the decisions makers' beliefs (optimism versus
pessimism), are represented by these subjective probabilities. Moreover, according to these authors,
"the subjective probabilities are the unique representation of decision-makers' beliefs" (ibid., p. 3).
In our context, those agents which give P values of higher than 0.5, shall be identified as optimists,
while those who give P values of less than or equal to 0.5, respectively, are identified as pessimists.
The expected income growth given beliefs (Zorn/Martin 1986, p. 166) then is:
(2)  [ ]
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This assumption has several implications: All in all, we have to take into account – with regard to
the same observation period – three different growth rates. The first is the actual growth rate, yt. The
second is the growth rate assigned to the optimist,  P
t y  and the complementary growth rate assigned
to the pessimist, 
) P 1 (
t y
- . The third is the expected growth rate,  e
t y  computed as given by equa-
tion (2) with
(3)  1 t
) P 1 (
t 1 t
P
t y y and y y -
-
- £ >
For convenience, we define:
(4)  ) P 1 (
1 t
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Optimism (pessimism) hence, has always two components: the occurrence of a desired (feared)
growth rate on the one hand and the assigned likelihood to that incident on the other. How is the
consumption function formalised? Agents decide on the rate of expenditure growth ( 1 t c + ) in period
2 ( 1 t+ ), based on past consumption growth ( t c ) and on experiences made in period 1, in conjunc-
tion with their own expectations regarding income growth ( ( ) [ ] e
t t y y f - ); expectations, in turn,
depend on weighted calculations vis-à-vis to period 0:

























) y )( P 1 (
) y ( P
y f c ) y y ( f c c






t t t 1 t
s
s
or, centred on period t:
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The first term of the consumption function on the right hand side of  (7) brings in the so-called
"habit persistence hypothesis", introduced first by Brown in 1952 (Sell 1982, p. 49) and provided
with empirical evidence in many econometric studies (see for example Lüdeke et al. 1983, pp. 42-
50 and, more recently, Dynan 1993). The second term on the right hand side captures (positive)Optimism, Pessimism and the Unforeseen: Modelling an Endogenous Business Cycle Driven by Strong Beliefs 12
surprises
viii or (negative) disillusions with regard to income growth in the immediate past. In line
with Carroll et al (1994, p. 1407), we suspect that "it is no longer clear that all relevant information
about the expected current growth rate of consumption should be contained in the lagged growth
rate of consumption".
Notice that the consumption function can neither be confounded with a random walk – the second
term on the right hand side can never become/be reduced to the error term ut or a function of it – nor
is the implied learning process identical to adaptive expectations. Also, we do not agree with those
who make a distinction between "Rule-of-thumb" consumers on the one hand and "Rational life-
cycle" consumers (Carroll et al. 1994, pp. 1401/2) on the other. It is hardly conceivable to create
two types of rationality in a Lucas-Barro-Sargent-Wallace world (at least, for the vast majority of
economists!). As opposed to this, in our framework, optimism and pessimism belong to the same
category of (ir)rationality.
Sixth: If a pessimist (an optimist) is surprised (disappointed), the concomitant revision of his ex-
pectations can induce the lower (upper) turning point of the business cycle. If a pessimist (optimist)
is confirmed by the economic realities, this reinforces the downswing (upswing) of the business
cycle.
This assumption should be explained further. The three relevant growth rates mentioned above can
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In the first case, "bad news is confirmed", a situation where the overwhelming majority of consum-
ers cannot but refrain from their demand. The second case leads to the lower turning point, as a
"positive surprise" will make pessimists rethink their attitude. Most likely, if good news is repro-
duced several times, they will switch to become optimists. The third case occurs in an optimistic
environment and is associated with "disillusion and disappointment" on the side of the optimists.
Again, if bad news is reproduced, optimists may switch to become pessimists and the upper turning
point of the business cycle is reached. In the last case, "good news is confirmed" and back the
judgement of an optimistic environment so that the upswing of the economy will be fostered.3  The Model 13
In the following Table 1 we have put together all four cases; as one can see, they are the result not
only of different types of errors, but also the consequence of different attitudes. Notice that in prin-
ciple, a third row dedicated to the "neutrals" exists, who, almost by definition, have rational expec-
tations. There errors can hence only be due to unforeseen shocks, as it is maintained in the NCM or
in "Monetarism II". With these stylised cases we are able to characterise the typical four phases of a
full business cycle.
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Source: Own compilation.
Let us make a heuristic numerical example for each of the aforementioned cases and let consumer
demand in the past grow at the rate of total income growth; we start (at
0 ; 003 . 0 ; 4 . 0 ) P 1 ( ; 6 . 0 P ; 03 . 0 c ; 025 . 0 y ; 03 . 0 y ) P 1 ( P
1 t 2 t 1 t = = = - = = = = -
- - - s s )
with the last case (iv), which is located in an upswing phase of the economy (that is,  P s  is posi-
tive, but small) and agents are optimistic but not euphoric (P is modest):
(8) 
[ ] [ ] { } [ ]
[ ] 0268 . 0 028 . 0 0032 . 0 f 03 . 0
) 025 . 0 ( 4 . 0 ) 003 . 0 025 . 0 ( 6 . 0 03 . 0 f 03 . 0 ct
> > + =
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Remember that in this situation we find ourselves already in an optimistic environment for the con-
sumers, so that the optimists are confirmed in their beliefs. That is why the upswing of the economy
is backed, or even reinforced.
What, if (iii) the  optimists are disappointed? This result can be achieved easily (now with
0 ; 008 . 0 ; 1 . 0 ) P 1 ( ; 9 . 0 P ; 03 . 0 c ; 025 . 0 y ; 03 . 0 y ) P 1 ( P
1 t 2 t 1 t = = = - = = = = -
- - - s s ),
whenever the boom of the cycle is almost reached (so that  P s  is positive and high) and agents'
optimism is "too strong" (and hence P is very high).
(9) 
[ ] [ ] { } [ ]
[ ] 033 . 0 0322 . 0 0022 . 0 f 03 . 0
) 025 . 0 ( 1 . 0 ) 008 . 0 025 . 0 ( 9 . 0 03 . 0 f 03 . 0 ct
< < - + =
+ + - + =
For a numerical example of the last two cases, we have to bear in mind that the economy is now in a
recession. At the very bottom of the business cycle, pessimism is deep (means  ) P 1 ( - is high) and
expected growth is extremely low ( ) P 1 ( - s is high). This first relevant situation can be illustrated
by the following numbers (suppose the variables/parameters are now  ; 025 . 0 y ; 025 . 0 y 2 t 1 t = = - -
005 . 0 ; 003 . 0 ; 9 . 0 ) P 1 ( ; 1 . 0 P ; 025 . 0 c ) P 1 ( P
1 t = = = - = = -
- s s ) and leads to the phenomenon
that (ii) pessimists are (positively) surprised:
(10) 
[ ] [ ] { } [ ]
[ ] 020 . 0 0208 . 0 0042 . 0 f 025 . 0
) 005 . 0 025 . 0 ( 9 . 0 ) 003 . 0 025 . 0 ( 1 . 0 025 . 0 f 025 . 0 ct
> > + =
- + + - + =
The last of our cases (i) represents a situation during economic recession, long before reaching the
bottom of the cycle (means  ) P 1 ( - is moderate and  ) P 1 ( - s  is low or insignificant) and can sub-
stantiate the case where the  pessimists are confirmed (suppose the numbers are now
0 ; 003 . 0 ; 6 . 0 ) P 1 ( ; 4 . 0 P ; 025 . 0 c ; 025 . 0 y ; 025 . 0 y ) P 1 ( P
1 t 2 t 1 t = = = - = = = = -
- - - s s ):
(11) 
[ ] [ ] { } [ ]
[ ] 0262 . 0 025 . 0 0012 . 0 f 025 . 0
) 025 . 0 ( 6 . 0 ) 003 . 0 025 . 0 ( 4 . 0 025 . 0 f 025 . 0 ct
< < - + =
+ + - + =
Before we proceed to further assumptions, it is worth thinking about the implied density functions
which can be assigned to the different subjective probabilities in our four scenarios. Suppose in the
first place, that economic growth rates are distributed symmetrically following, by and large, a
normal distribution. In Figure 1 we have depicted the cases which stand for agents' optimism, in
Figure 2 we have the two cases for pessimism, respectively.3  The Model 15
















Source:  Own compilation.
In each of the Figures, optimism or pessimism is represented geometrically by the surface under the
distribution and to the left of the critical past income growth rates, 
j c
1 t y - , given a pessimistic or
optimistic scenario. Notice that j = o, p stand for the optimistic (o) and for the pessimistic (p) situa-
tion (the numbers are 0.03 and 0.025 respectively) and c is the superscript standing for "critical".
Analytically, the corresponding expression is:
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Source:  Own compilation.
Seventh: The revision of optimistic or pessimistic expectations follows the rules of  Bayesian up-
dating.
x
This is supposed to be the most sophisticated assumption of the model, being, at the same time,
completely indispensable. Otherwise, consumers would not be learning and would therefore be af-
fected by what psychologists are used to call "perseverance". First of all it trivially implies that:
(13)  [ ] ) t ( g ) P 1 ( , P t t = -
In order to learn or, likewise, to update the subjective probabilities, agents have to take into account
favourable or less favourable information about the course of the economy; if the information cap-
tured is favourable (unfavourable), optimism (pessimism) should be maintained (corrected u p-
wards). What should be the yardstick for a favourable (unfavourable) economic development? Our
suggestion is to take the long-run steady state growth rate of the economy,  * y . A simple means to
detect a favourable (unfavourable) piece of information
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The actual growth rates of the economy in consideration (yt) fluctuate around the long-run steady
state growth rate of the economy,  * y , as it is depicted in Figure 3. The latter can be derived either
from a neo-classical, or from a new growth theory model. Assuming, for convenience, zero popula-
tion growth in either case, the per capita growth equals the absolute growth rate. The numbers cho-
sen correspond to our numerical example.








Source:  Own compilation.
The upper and lower numbers for economic growth we make use of in Figure 3, are those we al-
ready applied in our examples (i) through (iv); the equilibrium or trend growth rate (for income and
consumption),  * y , is assumed to be 0.0275 and is located symmetrically between the interim upper
and lower bounds. In doing so, we are a little more "conservative" than Lucas (1990, p. 23), who
argues with a benchmark value of consumption growth of 0.03. Again, according to him, one stan-
dard deviation of the log of consumption, is about 0.013, (two-sigma event  @ 0.025) which would
imply – in our case – bounding edges in the neighbourhood of 0.0405 and 0.0145 (not marked in
Figure 3).
Bayesian updating then has, for a discrete period, the following form:
xiiOptimism, Pessimism and the Unforeseen: Modelling an Endogenous Business Cycle Driven by Strong Beliefs 18
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Pessimism, hence, increases if unfavourable information is observed by private consumers. Not
only  ) P 1 ( , P t t - are time-variant, but are also as our numerical examples tended to support,
) P 1 ( P , - s s . The most simple approach states (see above) that:
(17)  [ ] [ ] ) P 1 ( , P , t h , t t





As our numerical examples tended to suggest, optimism (pessimism) always has two components:
the occurrence of an expected (feared) incident plus the associated probability. These components
are not independent, but correlate with each other. In Figure 4, we have depicted this relationship in
the first quadrant. The positive correlation may be strong (then the line is steep according to  a ) or
weak (then the line is flat according to  ' a ). In each case the line can only start once a minimal
probability has been surpassed. In quadrant four the falling line represents a continuum of prob-
abilities, constrained by the adding-up condition. Quadrant three encompasses the 45 degree line,
which helps to translate the results of the first and of the fourth quadrant into the second quadrant.
The main result of the second quadrant is to show that the subjective probability chosen by the pes-
simist (optimist), implicitly determines (because, basically, the numbers have to add up) the size of
the expected (feared) incident.
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Before we can proceed to the solution of the model, we should close it. Thus far, we have a tenta-
tive explanation of consumer behaviour under the influence of optimism and pessimism. For con-
venience, we restrict ourselves to a closed economy with private transactions only. The usual defi-
nition holds:
(22)  t t t I C Y + =














If we postulate – as done implicitly above in the numerical examples – that income growth equals
consumption growth:
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We define:
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If both of these shares are assumed constant, we achieve:









(28)  t t t i c y = =
As a result, the analysis of short-term and long-term income, or likewise investment development,
can be reduced to the analysis of income growth. Given this result, our key equation from above
simplifies to:
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All in all, the model contains 8 endogenous variables and 3 exogenous variables. When specifying
the function  (.) f in (29) as a linear function  (.) g , introducing (14) into (16) and the latter into (18)
and (19) which enter together into (29), equation (29) is an  inhomogenous difference equation of
the second order. Introducing:
(30)  2
1 t 1 t
P
1 t 1 t bP aP P - - - - - = - s4  A Simulation Exercise 21
and
(31)  2
1 t 1 t 1 t
2
1 t 1 t
) P 1 (
1 t 1 t dP dP 2 d cP c ) P 1 ( d ) P 1 ( c ) P 1 ( - - - - -
-
- - + - + + - = - + - - = - s
gives:
(32)  [ ] 1 t
2
1 t 2 t 1 t 1 t t P ) d 2 c a ( ) c d ( P ) b d ( y y y y - - - - - - + + - + - + - + = g
From the logic of the model, in equilibrium, the likelihood for pessimism and for optimism should
be about the same. Hence,
(33)  5 , 0 P P P *
1 t 0 = = = -
Then, we get, for  : *
2 t 1 t t y y y y = = = - -
(34)  [ ] d 025 , 0 c 5 , 0 b 025 , 0 a 5 , 0 y y * * + + - + = g
From (34) we can conclude that the term in brackets necessarily equals zero. Hence,
(35)  ) c a ( 20 b d + - =
As (14) and (16) are formulated as contingent equations, a straightforward solution of the homoge-
nous problem of  (32) is somehow complicated. Therefore, we proceed to a simulation exercise
which neither eliminates any important information of the model, nor is a hindering factor for an in-
depth analysis of the properties of the cycle. The parameter restriction found in  (35) is accom-
plished in all simulation experiments.
4  A SIMULATION EXERCISE
As Lucas has observed, any sensitive model of the business cycle should not contradict specific
regularities which were observed as co-movements among different aggregate time series (1994,
p. 217). What about these co-movements in our model? The following experiments have primarily a
heuristic aim: First of all we intend to show that the model is able to create – under plausible pa-
rameter assumptions – cycles of the real growth rate (consumption or likewise income). Secondly,
we shall demonstrate that the model can as well "produce" (i) converging oscillations (both at a
higher and at a lower new equilibrium), (ii) exploding oscillations as (iii) permanent oscillations.
Figures 5 and 7 are cases for (i), Figures 9 and 10 are cases for (ii), and Figures 6 and 8 are cases
for (iii).Optimism, Pessimism and the Unforeseen: Modelling an Endogenous Business Cycle Driven by Strong Beliefs 22













































































05 . 1 ; 03 . 0 ; 05 . 0 ; 02 . 0 ; 8 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0275 . 0 ; 33 . 0 0
* = - = = - = = = = = d c b a i P y g
Source: Own calculation.















































































05 . 1 ; 03 . 0 ; 05 . 0 ; 02 . 0 ; 8 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0275 . 0 ; 44 . 0 0
* = - = = - = = = = = d c b a i P y g
Source: Own calculation.4  A Simulation Exercise 23















































































05 . 1 ; 03 . 0 ; 05 . 0 ; 02 . 0 ; 8 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0275 . 0 ; 55 . 0 0
* = - = = - = = = = = d c b a i P y g
Source: Own calculation.













































































05 . 1 ; 03 . 0 ; 05 . 0 ; 02 . 0 ; 8 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0275 . 0 ; 66 . 0 0
* = - = = - = = = = = d c b a i P y g
Source: Own calculation.Optimism, Pessimism and the Unforeseen: Modelling an Endogenous Business Cycle Driven by Strong Beliefs 24












































































05 . 1 ; 03 . 0 ; 05 . 0 ; 02 . 0 ; 8 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0275 . 0 ; 77 . 0 0
* = - = = - = = = = = d c b a i P y g
Source: Own calculation.
















































































05 . 1 ; 03 . 0 ; 05 . 0 ; 02 . 0 ; 8 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0275 . 0 ; 88 . 0 0
* = - = = - = = = = = d c b a i P y g
Source: Own calculation.5  Empirical Evidence? 25
In all of the above experiments, we have maintained all parameters constant with the exception of g;
the latter, we have increased from 0.33 in Figure 5 up to 0.88 in Figure 10.
5  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE?
The majority of papers intending to make use of indicators which could reflect consumers' beliefs,
draw on measures of so-called " consumer confidence" (Acemoglu/Scott 1994, p. 1) or " consumer
sentiment" (Delorme Jr et al. 2001, p. 864). The Gallup-Survey, for example, takes into account
(and later averages over them) responses to five questions given by consumers who were asked
about their last year experiences with "general economic conditions" and their "household f i-
nances", the "expectations of change" in these variables over the next year and, finally about
whether "it is a good time to make a major purchase" (Acemoglu/Scott 1994, p. 3). However, com-
puting a simple average of these responses is like comparing apples with pears: Whereas having
positive (negative) expectations regarding the future in the forward looking answers reveals, by and
large, the size of optimism (pessimism) among the interviewed people, the backward looking an-
swers – and also the answer with regard to the propensity to purchase in the present – give some
hint as to what extent people were surprised (disillusioned) in the immediate past. The multidimen-
sionality of combining different attitudes with different types of errors gets lost, if one simply iden-
tifies low (high) confidence with "consumers (being) depressed (glad) and pessimistic (optimistic)
about the current state of the economy" (Delorme Jr et al. 2001, p. 866). In this simplistic view,
pessimism (optimism) is "caused" by a good (bad) expected state of the economy and it is no longer
possible to explain the business cycle as being driven by strong private beliefs among private agents
and the corresponding updating of these beliefs according to the development of the economy. If
agents are either just "pessimistic" or "optimistic", then there is no room for explaining the turning-
points in the business cycle.
The ICS (University of Michigan) is based also on the responses to five questions; "among the five
questions used to compile the index are two major components: One reflects consumer assessments
of current economic conditions; another focuses on expectations about the future” (Kinsey/Collins
1990, p. 206). Theses two components of the ICS "make up two separate indices called the index of
consumer expectations (ICE) and the index of current economic conditions (ICEC)” (ibid.). This
separation is an improvement, but still: How are expectations towards the future and the perception
of the present related to each other? In a rational expectations framework Kinsey and Collins (1990,
pp. 209-214) estimate the ICE as, among other things, a function of the ICEC. This procedure is, if
at all, only half way of explaining the disillusion of optimists/positive surprise of pessimists. Rather
it is in line with two of our four scenarios in Table 1: "good (bad) news is confirmed".Optimism, Pessimism and the Unforeseen: Modelling an Endogenous Business Cycle Driven by Strong Beliefs 26
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, many of those papers come up basically with a correct mes-
sage: Not only is the state of the economy reflected in consumers' confidence, but also "consumer
sentiment causes fluctuations in GNP" (Matsusaka/Sboordone 1995, p. 297). Empirical investiga-
tions support the presumption that consumer confidence is positively (negatively) correlated with
good (bad) news from the real macro-economy ( Delorme Jr et al. 2001, p. 866). It can also be
shown that indicators of consumers' confidence do work as leading indicators for the change in the
consumption of goods (ibid., p. 868). There is also econometric evidence for the hypothesis that
"exogenous changes in consumer sentiment have real effects on output" ( Matsusaka/Sboordone
1995, p. 317). Why this can be and how it can be, were key questions addressed in this paper.
6  SOME CONCLUSIONS AND THE SCOPE FOR FUTURE R E-
SEARCH
It seems as if not only positive or negative "surprises" in a Lucas-Barro-Sargent-Wallace world can
induce significant real effects on the (supply side) of the economy. In our model, where the econ-
omy is driven by the growth of consumption and investment plays a merely passive role, positive
surprises among pessimists and disillusions among optimists, are the keys for the explanation of the
turning points during a business cycle. The confirmation of good (bad) news helps to explain the
persistence of a boom (recession). This insight is both consistent with the long lasting upswing of
the US economy during the Clinton years, as also with the reluctance of the European economy to
achieve a more dynamic momentum.
This paper can be understood as only a first step into a broad field of research, both on a theoretical
and on an empirical basis. Most likely, we economists should learn more about strong beliefs of
economic agents such as "optimism" and "pessimism". It is also more than likely that a discipline
such as psychology, can contribute to a better understanding of these human attitudes. In particular,
we should analyse in more depth, the preconditions for the likelihood of agents switching from one
mood to another. What about persistence and hysteresis effects, which we have not touched at all in
our exposition? Also, the indicators mentioned and used in the present by research institutes for the
prediction of economic growth and consumption expenditures purposes, should be revised accord-
ing to a thorough identification of items. Judgements of private agents with regard to the present
state of the economy, the future prospects of growth and, finally, with regard to the (expected or
unexpected) achievements in the immediate past, should be collected and analysed separately and
not be aggregated to a diffuse measure of "confidence".REFERENCES
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ENDNOTES
i  For valuable comments on an earlier draft, I would like to thank Volker Hofmann, Silvio Kermer and Marcus Mit-
tendorf. I also appreciate Silvio Kermer's help during the simulation experiments.
ii  The paper of Kinsey and Collins (1990), however, aims at showing that the ICS is consistent with rational consumer
behavior.
iii  Notice that Ragnar Frisch (1933) was most likely the first economist interested in the business cycle who strictly
differentiated between "impulse and propagation".
iv  Yet, Garrison (1991, p. 98) finds "more differences than similarities" between the real business cycles theory
(RBCT) and Wicksell's contribution, as the interest rate is important for his theory, but not for RBCT.
v  Yet, the correlation between optimism (pessimism) and overconfidence, is far from being clear: One may argue that
it is not the optimists who misjudge the capabilities of their adversaries, but rather the pessimists. Optimists are not
automatically "overconfident about the precision of their knowledge" (Odean 1998, p. 1888). On the contrary, it
may be that they transfer a job/task to other agents because they expect them to do a great job. They can be optimis-
tic about the outcome, no matter if they themselves or others will be the acting persons. It is definitely not an atti-
tude of optimists to "overestimate the degree to which they were instrumental in bringing it (the positive result, the
author) about" (ibid., p. 1893).
vi  Lucas himself has introduced this criterion as significant for any serious attempt to explain the business cycle (ibid.,
1994, p. 225).
vii  This equation almost seems to fulfil what Lucas finds to be a main qualitative feature of business cycles: "techni-
cally, movements about trend in gross national product in any country can well be described by a stochastically dis-
turbed difference equation of very low order" (ibid., 1994, p. 217).
viii If anybody would seriously doubt the affirmation that "surprises" always have a positive connotation, he should take
a look at a desert menu in a French restaurant.
ix  In truth, there are two more alternatives (v)   e
t t
P
t y y y < < - ) 1 (  and (vi)   e
t t
P
t y y y > >  which, however, are irrelevant
for our purpose.
x  Notwithstanding the existing methodological critique against Bayesian concepts of decision making (Toulet 1986,
Schmeidler 1989), this approach seems to fit best the problem of learning given "prior" subjective probabilities. This
view in implicitly backed by Lucas and Sargent (1988, p. 315): "Bayesian learning is vacuous until one ... imputes a
prior distribution to agents".
xi  See for a procedure in the same vein Demougin (1999, p. 305).
xii  See Yamane (1976, p. 547).